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ABSTRACT 
In Japan, a liberalization policy was implemented over railways and buses in 
2000 and 2002 respectively. Under that policy, quantity regulations for railways 
and buses were abolished, withdrawal regulations were eased, although fare 
regulations were maintained. However, even after this liberalization, institutional 
design remains considerably different between Japan and EU countries. An 
argument for competitive tendering is missing in Japan as 87.5% of rail 
passenger transport in the three major metropolitan areas is provided by 
profitable private railway companies that enjoy high social evaluation in respect 
to managerial efficiency, quality of transport services, and the adequacy of are 
levels and systems. The major private railway companies in the big cities have 
built their present status by 1) being blessed with favourable transport markets, 
2) developing commercialism in their investment activities, 3) pursing efficient 
management, and 4) engaging in business diversification. The Japan Railways 
group companies (former Japanese National Railways) and Tokyo Metro co., 
which is in the midst of privatization, are now copying the style of corporate 
management of major private railway companies. The problem for public 
transport policy in Japan is its inability to cover some "market failure" issues 
occurring in big cities and rural areas under the existing institutional design. 
After the liberalization, new trials appeared where third sector companies were 
founded to retain unprofitable railway lines in local cities. New bus transport 
services were also introduced under a newly established cooperative relationship 
between local authorities and residents and so on. Paradoxically, as a result of 
liberalization, a change began to appear in the common sense of Japanese people 
that commercialism is rather natural to the management of public transport.  
Especially in metropolitan areas, many market failures issues are left behind such 
as the incompatibility of a continued commercialism with providing comfortable 
commutation services. In Japan, private railways have, so far, performed their 
Takahiko Saito 2 
transport operations without governmental subsidy, except for some unprofitable 
services in local cities or rural areas. Although rail commutation transport in big 
cities is no exception, it has become very difficult for private railways to engage 
in large-scale investment activities to expand their capacity which is 
indispensable to realize comfortable commutation services. Since private railway 
companies may not receive public assistance of the government, vertical 
separation of ownership (not operation) is more and more used in order to allow 
for public spending in the construction of new commutation railway lines 
(infrastructure). 
INTRODUCTION 
When we look at the transport policy of economically advanced countries, we find that there are 
 many similar features.  For example, in most countries, roads and highways and accompanying  
infrastructure are provided  as public goods,: further, in transport markets where competition is 
dominant,  liberalization and abolition of economic regulations has been promoted. On the other 
hand, some of the features vary greatly across the countries. The large difference between the 
local (regional) public transport policies of  Japan and the EU countries is a conspicuous 
example.  
 In Japan, maintaining the self-supporting rule of transport companies and ensuring a lively and 
efficient management that is focussed profitability are preferred: further this has resulted in 
desirable  results. On the other hand, in the  EU countries, measures corresponding to the  
‘market failure’ phenomenon which tends to appear in the local public transport sectors of both  
big cities and rural areas, is preferred.  
 This paper discusses the factors that give rise to the  unique features of  the policy dispute in 
Japan and also discusses the policy disputes with regard to certain types of  market failures 
issues that have seemingly vanished in Japan.  
UNIQUE  FEATURES  OF  THE  RAILWAY  INDUSTRY  IN  JAPAN 
In Japan, the rail and bus transportation sector was liberalized in 2000 and 2002, respectively. 
Under this policy, quantity regulations were abolished, and the withdrawal regulations were 
eased, although fare regulations were maintained.  However, even after this liberalization, 
institutional design remains considerably different between Japan and the EU countries.  
 In the three major metropolitan (transport) areas of Japan, 87.5% of rail passenger traffic  is 
carried by private railway companies, including the three mainland Japan railway companies 
(former Japanese National Railways), which were privatised in 1987 and became completely 
private between 2002 and 2006, and Tokyo Metro Co., which was privatized in 2004. There are 
more than 70 large, medium, and small railway companies offering passenger services in the 
three metropolitan areas. A ‘metropolitan area’ comprises local divisions within 50 kilometres 
from the city centre. A ‘transport area’ comprises areas in the same circle from where we can s 
commute to the city centre. 
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       Table 1: Volume of Passenger Traffic (in million persons) in the Three Major 
Transport Areas by Transport Mode (2005) 
 Major 
 Urban areas 
 
 Railways(inclu 
ding Light Rail)
   Buses 
 
 Hired cars
 & taxies 
  Private 
  cars 
   Total 
 
 Tokyo  
Area 
    13,575 
    (57%) 
    1,685 
    (7%) 
    738 
    (3%) 
    7,918 
   (33%) 
   23,916 
  (100%) 
 Osaka 
  Area 
    4,790 
    (48%) 
     745 
    (8%) 
    298 
   (3%) 
    4,165 
   (42%) 
   9,998 
  (100%) 
Nagoya 
area 
    1,139 
    (22%) 
     187 
    (4%) 
    108 
   (2%) 
    3,784 
   (73%) 
   5,218 
  (100%) 
  Population (in thousands):Tokyo Area: 29,322, Osaka Area: 15,815,  Nagoya  Area: 9,061 
     
 
   Table 2: Railway Passenger Traffic (in million persons) in the Three Major Transport 
Areas carried by JR, Private Railways, Subways, and Streetcars(2005) 
   Areas 
 
JR East, We
st & Central 
  Private 
  railways 
 Subways(To 
kyo Metro*) 
 Street cars 
 
   Total 
 
 Tokyo Trans- 
 port Area 
    5,381 
   (40%) 
   5,123 
   (38%) 
3,031(2,102*)
    (22%)  
     40 
   (0.3%) 
   13,535 
  (100%) 
 Osaka Trans- 
 port Area 
    1,354 
   (28%) 
   2,138 
   (45%) 
      1,267 
      (27%)     
     31 
   (0.7%) 
   4,790 
  (100%) 
Nagoya Trans-
 port Area 
     230 
   (20%) 
    487 
   (43%) 
        419 
      (37%)  
      3 
   (0.3%) 
   1,139 
  (100%) 
 Total     6,965  
   (36%) 
   7,748 
   (40%) 
      4,717 
     (24%) 
     74 
   (0.4%) 
  19,464 
  (100%) 
  *Tokyo Metro Co. only runs the subway, but is considered to belong  to the group of 16 major private 
railways  
 
 In addition to the self-sufficiency of  these railway companies, another unique feature of the 
industrial organization of railways, which is very unusual in advanced nations, is that with the   
exception of a small number of railway infrastructure companies, private railway companies in 
the three metropolitan areas are running profitable railway businesses. Above all, the 16 major 
private railways companies that account for 46% of total railway passenger traffic  in these large 
cities are parts of  industrial groups that enjoy high social prestige with regard to their  
managerial efficiency, quality of facilities, hospitality, and fare structure and systems. It can be 
said that these companies are the locomotives of the Japanese railway industry. After  
privatization, the Japan Railways group companies (former Japanese National Railways) have 
been adopting the corporate management style of major private railway companies and have 
attained  considerable success in revitalising their railway businesses. This unique situation of  
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   Table 3: Industrial Organization and the Profitability of the Passenger Railway 
Companies (fiscal 2005)              
  Number of companies      Profitability   Classification of Japanese railway
  Companies   Japan  (Three maj
or cities) 
  Surplus    Loss 
  JR  Passengers 
  Private－ Majors 
               －Semi-Majors 
  － Medium & Small Companies# 
              (Monorails , Guideways)
                (ex-JNR or JR line) 
  Municipal Enterprises 
       6 
      16 
     4+1* 
  122+10*
     (16) 
   (39+1*)
      12 
    (3) 
   (15) 
  (4+1*) 
  (25+8*)
    (13) 
    ( 0) 
    ( 6) 
    3 
     16 
    4+1* 
   55+5* 
   (12) 
   ( 4) 
       9 
       3§ 
       0 
       0 
   67+5* 
    ( 4) 
  (35+1*) 
        3 
  Total    160+11*   (53+9*)    87+6*    73 +5* 
# including third sector local railway companies that took over the discontinued JNR, JR lines,  
*railway  infrastructure companies,   §the group of  three JR island companies, whose deficits can be 
compensated  using the special fund  founded by the Japanese government that was transferred to the 
private owners at the outset of  the privatization of the JR Group. 
 
 the  Japanese private railway companies has led to questions as to why competitive tendering is 
missing in the local public transport policy in Japan. 
In 2005, apart from the 21 cable-car companies operating in tourist destinations, there were 
184 railway companies, 171 of which were offering passenger services while 12 were railway 
infrastructure companies. The total (heavy-rail) length of the 16 majors is 2,951km, mere 15% 
of the six JR passenger companies (19,999km). Nevertheless, the number of passengers 
transported by the 16 majors is 129% of the total number of passengers transported by the six 
JR companies, and also the passengers-km figure of the 16 railway companies is 54% of the six 
JR companies. In the Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya metropolitan areas, in particular, the 16 majors 
carry far more passenger traffic than the JR companies (59% vs. 41%), confirming that the 
principal areas of activity for  the major private railways are large cities. 
FAVORABLE  MARKET  CONDITIONS  FOR  THE  MANAGEMENT  OF 
URBAN  RAILWAYS 
When it comes to railway operations in large cities, almost all private railway companies－with 
the exception of the three railway infrastructure companies that incurred a temporary loss 
because of  the special conditions under which they were founded－are soundly managed and 
are in the black. However, outside the big cities, more than a few private railway companies are 
facing operational difficulties. This tendency is quite prevalent in the local private railway 
companies in the provincial transport sector and the group of third sector local railway 
companies that took over the discontinued local lines of JNR or the new lines under 
construction in the 1980s, on which the JNR renounced the right of succession.  
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  Regardless, it is particularly noteworthy  that almost all railway companies with operation in 
the big cities have been soundly managed for a long period of time. The urban railways 
companies’ sound finances that make them independent of  government subsidies are quite 
remarkable when looked at from the perspective of other countries. These major private railway 
companies have attained their present financial status by (1) being blessed with favourable 
transport markets,  (2) developing commercialism in their investment activities, (3) pursuing 
efficient management practices,  and (4) diversifying their businesses.  
  As is widely known, the transport markets in large Japanese cities are quite favourable to 
managers of railway companies. In particular, the  Tokyo and Osaka metropolitan areas are 
densely-populated metropolises, and most commuters going to the city centres use railways.  
In Japan, in any discussion on the management of railway companies, the data of traffic density 
(number of passengers in transit per day-km) plays an important role. Most of the major private 
railways have an average traffic density of more than 100,000. In the case of companies whose 
traffic density is extremely high (Tokyu Railways., Tokyo Metro., Odakyu Railways., and Keio 
Railways. in the Tokyo area), the average traffic density exceeds 240,000.  
  At the same time, even among the 16 major private companies, there are some companies who 
run  large railway networks spanning rural areas have low traffic densities. For example, the 
traffic density of To-bu Railways.(Tokyo) whose network is 463km long is around 75,000, 
which is almost equivalent to that of JR Central (73,000) whose network is 1,971km. The 
average traffic density of Kintetsu Railways.(Osaka)whose network is 582km is about 57, 000, 
and is slightly higher than 46,000 of JR East, whose network is 7,527km long. Incidentally, the 
average traffic density of the 16 major private railway companies is 108,000. The corresponding 
figure are 33,700 for the 6 JR passenger companies, - 43,700 for the 3 JR Mainland companies, 
and mere 7,000 for the 3 JR island companies.  
  As mentioned above, the most outstanding feature of the Japanese private railway companies 
is that they operate on the principle of profit and that  most Japanese take this as a given. This 
also illustrates how the investment behaviour of the private railway companies is much 
appreciated in Japan. In some instances, private railway companies have been very sensitive to 
investment risk and made decisions against the social expectancies with regard to network 
addition or capacity expansion.  
  However, the Japanese people seemed to be rather tolerant toward such ‘egoistic’ behaviour of 
the private railway companies. It is likely that the existence of national railways (JNR) and the 
public enterprises in big cities might have served as a reminder to private railway companies to 
stick to relatively risk-free investments. Before privatization, JNR and other public enterprises 
were allowed to take high-risk investments in line with specific objectives, and were, in turn, 
compensated by government subsidies. 
  In the past, there have been more than a few railway companies operating in big cities that 
undertook high-risk investments and ultimately went bankrupt, resulting in a their assets being  
acquired by the government and/or rival railway companies.  
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BUSINESS  DIVERSIFICATION:  PRIVATE  RAILWAY  COMPANIES  AS 
URBAN  DEVELOPERS  
  Business diversification is also an important feature of Japanese railway companies. In 
particular, the major private railway companies can no longer be viewed as mere railway or 
transport companies. These are akin to urban developers or local service providers supporting 
the lives of people living along the railway line. Today, JR passenger companies have also 
morphed into such life-supporting businesses. The JR Group companies run real estate 
businesses, hotels, leisure properties, and sometimes act as urban developers in both big cities 
and regional cities.  
  Most private railway companies have attempted to diversify their businesses ever since they 
started operations. Since there was a strong tendency to readily permit private railway 
constructions in areas with no railway lines, in order to survive, the newly-established 
companies had to increase the population near their lines and attract as many passengers as 
possible by creating shopping areas or entertainment avenues along their lines. This practice led 
to the adoption of  business diversification practices by Japanese private railway companies in 
the big cities. 
  The new line, Den-en-toshi (garden city) line of Tokyu Railways－Japan’s largest railway 
company with about 400 subsidiaries and affiliated companies and more than 100,000 
employers－is the latest example of such business diversification. The company constructed the  
20.1km (over 15 stations) long “Den-en-toshi” line in the southwestern suburbs of Tokyo 
between 1963 and 1984. At present, the population along the stretch exceeds 500,000.  Teaming 
–up with its group companies, Tokyu Railways also constructed many shopping and 
recreational facilities, and educational and medical utilities. Life in towns developed by private 
railway companies sometimes referred to as providing ‘cradle-to-grave security’, however, 
these towns do seem to have a considerably good reputation. 
Another example is the line constructed by Hankyu railways. in the Osaka area. The Hankyu 
Group－ with 117 subsidiaries and 31 affiliates－is a railway company that has indulged in  
vigorous urban development along its railway lines. While suffering from occasional setbacks,  
Hankyu was persistent in developing recreational facilities and tourist spots along the line, and 
department stores, hotels and office buildings at the terminals. The exclusive residential towns 
along the lines came to be collectively known as the "Hankyu Plain". － Generally speaking, the 
railway towns developed by private railway companies are planned and mostly well-maintained 
and offer  affordable housing lots and high-quality houses. As such, private railway companies 
in large cities enjoy immense social prestige as urban developers. 
COMPETITIVE   AND  COOPERATIVE  RELATIONSHIPS  AMONG 
RAILWAY  COMPANIES  
  Efficient management in the private railway companies is the result of both their favourable 
market conditions and their daily earnest efforts towards  high managerial and operational 
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efficiency. Besides, the strict fare regulation imposed by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure 
and Transport on the railway and bus companies might also be a cause of high efficiency.  
However, the ongoing liberalization has led to the railway and bus fares only being bound for  
an upper limit. Nevertheless, the essential aspect of these fare regulations still retains the 
traditional characteristics of  a ‘natural monopoly’ style. The basic fare for the 6 JR companies  
and 16 major private companies are estimated through the elaborate ‘rate-base’ procedures 
based on the traditional full-cost principle. Furthermore, the ministry uses ‘yardstick evaluation’ 
to assess the operating costs submitted to it by the railway companies while seeking approval 
for fare revisions. As per this evaluation, the ministry estimates the base cost using a series of 
regressive equations corresponding to the types of railway companies. (J R Group company, 
private railway company, and subway operator). The base costs evaluated are publicized and in 
the case where the actual cost of the undertaker exceeds the base cost, the ministry regards the 
base cost as a proper cost, and where the actual cost is less than the base cost, the average cost 
of the two is considered as the proper cost.  In addition, the ministry compares the difference 
between the actual costs and the base cost and calculates the ‘ratio of efforts’ made toward 
attaining management efficiency over several years. The half of this figure is then  added to or 
subtracted from the base cost.   
   Although this stringent and traditional method of fare regulation seems to be a likely cause of 
the high levels of management efficiency in Japanese railway companies, it should also be 
pointed out that this results in the companies having large disparities in their fare structures and 
in obstacles when introducing plain and attractive fare systems in big cities.  Lack of a public 
compensation policy for the concessionary fares introduced for students and for other welfare 
purposes also indicate the backward character of the regional public transport policy of the 
Japanese government. 
 Further,  in large cities, we observe some very interesting relationships among the railway 
companies,: we refer to these as ‘competitive and cooperative relationships’.  Railway 
companies, needless to say, are rivals and compete in terms of management efficiency, and  
 profits to provide good services. The brand image that has been laboriously built further 
intensifies competition among the railway companies.  
   However, at the same time, these railway companies have a keen sense for building strong 
cooperative relationships with other railway companies for purposes of improving the 
competitive position of the railways or the public transport in the transport market. Joint train 
operations among railway companies, widespread in big cities are good examples of such 
cooperative relationships. New technologies system automation and convenient card-type 
tickets have been successfully introduced because of these cooperative relationships. 
JOINT  TRAIN  OPERATIONS  AND  THE  LARGE  CARRYING 
CAPACITIES  SEEN  IN  BIG  CITIES 
 As a rule, individual railway companies in large cities hold monopoly in their territories. 
However, because of the circumstances leading to the formation of the present railway 
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Table 4: Route Kilometres of Public Transport in three Major Transport Areas (2006)  
 Major urban areas      J  R Private railways*  Subways# Street cars    Buses 
  Tokyo Area 
  Osaka Area 
  Nagoya Area 
    887.2 
    502.6 
    238.8 
       1,149.5 
         788.9 
         596.3 
   332.6 
   177.4 
    89.1 
    17.2 
    51.3 
      0.0 
  15,918.6 
  10,827.7 
   5,864.9 
 Total   1,628.6       2,534.7    599.1     68.5   32,611.2 
   Japan  19,998.5       6,511.3    691.7    207.8  357,103.0
   *excluding Tokyo Metro Co.  # including Tokyo Metro Co. 
 
network －most JR local lines were originally intercity lines－there are instances wherein  a JR 
company and one or more than one private railway company maintain lines in the same area and 
compete with each other. In particular, in Osaka area where JR West and several private railway 
companies compete directly, the railways companies are very active in setting competitive fares 
and improving speed and comfort. 
   Even then, there are a number of joint train operations. The cooperative relationships have led 
to the unique features that are characteristic of the urban commuter railway system in Japan. In 
the Tokyo area,  joint train operations are seen over ten subway lines that go to the Tokyo city 
centre. Further, the number of railway companies offering such services, has reached fourteen . 
JR East, eight major private railways, and three medium/small private railway companies run 
their commuter trains on to the Tokyo Metro Co., and the Tokyo Municipal Subway lines, and 
vice versa.  
  The previously mentioned Den-en-Toshi line of Tokyu Railways is connected to the Hanzo- 
mon line of the Tokyo Metro Co., and this connection enables both Tokyu and Tokyo Metro 
trains to run on the other company’s lines. In the Osaka area, thirteen railway companies offer 
joint train services over seven subway lines. In the Nagoya area, two railway companies offer 
joint train services over two subway lines.  
  Other remarkable characteristics of Japan’s urban railway system are the huge transport 
capacity, high train frequency, and extreme overcrowding during rush hours. In the Tokyo area, 
on double track sections, the number of trains per hour (in one direction) often 30 during the 
rush hour. In the Osaka area, the corresponding figure is  25 – 26.  Despite the huge carrying 
capacity, extreme levels of congestion are common, often reaching more than 180% of the 
carrying capacity. For the more crowded lines in the Tokyo area, this figure exceeds 200%. In 
the Osaka and Nagoya areas, serious congestion was prevalent in the 1970s, but this is no longer 
the case. The ministry has set a target of 180% in the Tokyo area,; note that the actual conges- 
tion rate in the Osaka area and Nagoya areas is already less than 150%.   
However, the causes behind the reduction in the congestion are different for the two cities.  
Apart from capacity augmentation,－common in both cities－, the long-term recession in the 
regional economy is an important factor in the Osaka area. Furthermore, direct competition 
between railway companies, especially between JR West and the major private railway  
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Table 5: Rail Transport in Big Cities (2005):   Data for the Most congested Hour (in 
one direction)in the Most congested Section  
Railway line  Number
of trains 
Type of
  trains 
 Carrying 
 capacity 
 Number of  
passengers 
Congestion
    rate 
Double track       
 Tokyu Railways.Den-En-Toshi
 line 
 Keio Railways.  Main line 
 Tokyo Metro Co. Chiyoda line 
 JR East.  Chuo line (Rapid) 
 JR East.  Yamanote line  
     29 
    
30 
     29 
     30 
     24 
    2 
 
    3 
    1 
    1 
    1 
     42,746 
 
     42,000 
     41,296 
     42,000 
     39,072 
     82,874 
 
     71,313 
     74,113 
     88,650 
     84,560 
    196 % 
 
    170% 
    179% 
    211% 
    216% 
Quadruple track        
 JR East. Sobu line   (Rapid) 
                                  (Local) 
 Tobu Railways.  Isesaki line 
 Keihan Ry.  Main line** 
    19* 
    26 
    44* 
    44 
    1 
    1 
    4 
    5 
     35,416 
     38,480 
     50,712 
     40,248 
     63,360 
     79,590 
     70,653 
     50,296 
    179% 
    207% 
    139% 
    125% 
   *excluding inter-city express trains  ** Osaka area (the other examples are of  the Tokyo area) 
 
companies in the Osaka area, has led to decreased traffic in the major private railway companies.  
Between 1990 and 2005, the share of  the 5 major private railway companies in terms of the 
total passenger traffic had dropped to 76%. If  JR West is included, the corresponding figure is 
93% . Further, unlike Osaka, Nagoya is rather less densely-populated and is susceptible to 
motorization.  As such, it can be stated that the main cause of the decrease in the passenger 
traffic in Nagoya －the combined share of  JR Central and Nagoya Railways decreased to 86% 
－is because of the increase in the use of private cars. 
 PUBLIC  SUBSIDIES  IN THE  LOCAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT POLICY OF 
JAPAN 
A difference between the EU or North American countries and Japan with regard to the local 
public transport policy is that Japanese railway companies, even the public ones, are responsible 
for arranging the capital investment needed to construct new lines, augment carrying capacity, 
or procure new rolling stock. As a rule, Japanese railway companies or enterprises should be 
self-supporting, and should be capable of covering their operation costs and infrastructure costs.  
  However, in the case of urban railways, some public subsidies are provided by the government 
for the construction of new railway lines. Public enterprises of local authorities, Tokyo Metro 
Co. (formerly, the Tokyo Rapid Transit Authority), and the third sector railway companies are 
qualified for government subsidies. These government subsidies cover up to 70% of the 
construction costs of new subway lines, and up to 35% of the construction costs of ‘new town’ 
railway lines and so on. However, the JR Group companies and the private railway companies 
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are ineligible for these public subsidies, because there are laws in place to prohibit the 
appropriation of public subsidies for the creation of private assets by private companies.  
   Exceptions to this rule are the ‘three island" companies of the JR Group and the private 
railway companies in regional cities or rural areas. When the privatization of JNR was started in 
1987, the government founded ‘management stabilization fund’ of 1,300 billion yen (around 
€100 billion)and transferred it to the three JR three islands companies (JR Hokkaido, JR 
Shikoku, JR Kyushu). The government implemented a ‘break-even’ rule for the three island 
companies to compensate the operating deficits with the money acquired from the fund.  This 
fund, though owned by the three island companies, is effectively acts as a government subsidy.  
Further, local private railway companies are classified into two groups－traditional private 
railway companies and  third sector local railway companies that took over the unprofitable 
rural lines of JNR. The ministry has been supporting unprofitable local railways that cannot be 
easily replaced by bus transport because of the lack of  road infrastructure, heavy snowfall in 
winter, and the existence of  lump demand during peak hours (which render buses insufficient). 
However even in the provincial public transport sector, many medium & small private railway 
companies (mentioned in Table 3) are in profit and are efficiently managed. It is especially 
noteworthy that 16 of the 19 companies were in profit (as of 2005) even though they catered to 
routes where traffic densities are low between 3,000 to 9,999 persons per day-km.  
 When the traffic density is less than 3000, most railway companies go into the red, and have no 
choice but to seek public subsidies to continue operations. However, in Japan, revenue-support 
subsidies are not preferred. Up until 1996 there used to be a public subsidy policy to cover the 
deficits of local private railway companies,: thereafter,  it was replaced by a new subsidy system 
that sought to modernize and/or replace the railway facilities to improve profitability. For 
example, these subsidies are used to introduce ticket-vending machines and/or devices that 
promote one-man operation of trains. It seems that the main purpose of  these  government 
subsidies is to bring the local private railway companies back into the black. A peculiar 
exception, however, would be the third sector local railways that were covered by revenue-
support subsidies for five years after their establishment.  
  In large cities, the lack of  public subsidies for J R companies and private railway companies 
has resulted in the emergence of serious ‘missing –links’. In particular, in the Osaka and 
Nagoya areas, where the private railway companies have trunk commuter lines, serious gaps in  
the railway network have appeared near the city centres. In order to solve such problems, the 
ministry expanded the existing public subsidies for the subway construction to cover the 
construction of subways by the third sector railway infrastructure companies in 2000.  
Consequently, some trunk commuter lines were constructed in Osaka and Nagoya.  
  Here, after the completion of new subway lines, private railway companies rent the 
infrastructure created by the third sector companies using government subsidies until the expiry   
of  the repayment options for the borrowed money (after around 25% of the construction cost 
has been repaid). Thereafter the private railway companies (train operators) purchase the 
infrastructure in instalments over a period of 30 years. 
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 IMPORTANCE  OF  REALIZING  MARKET  FAILURES   
As described above, the presence of excellent private transport companies (in both rail and buse 
transport) has led to the emergence of the unique characteristics of  the Japanese local public 
transport policy. It can be said that Japan’s policy of preferring self-supporting, profitable 
companies that are soundly managed has succeeded in a sense of .   
   Regardless, the Japanese public transport policy does suffer from one critical drawback. One 
problem worth examining is the country’s inability to cover some ‘market failure’ issues in big 
cities and rural areas under the existing institutional framework. After privatization of JNR, new 
companies －referred to as third  sector companies －took over  unprofitable railway lines in 
regional cities. New bus transport services were also introduced under the ownership and 
operation newly established cooperative entities comprising local authorities and residents . 
With  regarding to the construction of new railway lines in big cities and regional cities, vertical 
separation of ownership and operation is becoming increasingly prevalent.  Paradoxically, 
because of  liberalization, Japanese public perception  that self-supporting rule and profitability 
are seen as essential for public transport companies  has underwent  a  remarkable change. 
  Discussions on market failure issues in public transport policy are easily understood when it is 
associated with ‘decreasing average (fixed)costs " of railway industry. We can assume that two 
types of market failure can occur in the domain of the local public transport policy. The 
necessary condition for the market failures in this domain is that the average costs of providing 
transport services are decreasing, and the sufficient condition is the lack of alternative transport 
services. The first is what occurs when there is decreasing demand for public transport, which is 
common in economically advanced countries. The Management Stabilization Fund for the JR 
three island companies is an excellent example to prevent market failures in a railway business 
wherein traffic density is not that high. Further, though limited at present, vertical separation 
policy (organizational or mere in accounting system) to sustain and possibly turn around 
unprofitable railways is becoming increasingly prevalent in the provincial areas in Japan. 
  The latter market failure relates to the public transport policy that aims to cater to trunk 
commuter services in big cities. Most non-Japanese perceive comprehensive and widespread 
commuter networks to not be self-supporting and requiring subsidies or other forms of 
governmental help. However, as mentioned above, the Japanese have been thinking otherwise. 
As such, in Japan’s major cities, market failure issues related to the incompatibility of providing 
widespread network and comfortable commuter services with self-sufficient profitable 
companies, seemingly vanish. 
However, in reality, at times, it becomes very difficult for private railways to make large-scale 
investments for capacity augmentation, which is indispensable for passenger comfort. The 
decrease in congestion in the commuter network of Osaka and Nagoya provided much relief to 
many commuters. However, Tokyo still experiences ‘Tsu-kin jigoku(commuting inferno)’   
every morning and every evening. As such, the public transport policy ought to recognize the 
market failure issues related to capacity improvement and augmentation in the Tokyo area. 
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Since private railway companies may not receive public assistance by the government, vertical 
separation between ownership and operation is increasingly becoming prevalent to enable 
public spending in the construction of new commuter railway lines(infrastructure).   
 
